Uploaded image for project: 'OASIS OSLC Lifecycle Integration Core (OSLC Core) TC'
  1. OASIS OSLC Lifecycle Integration Core (OSLC Core) TC
  2. OSLCCORE-40

Potential click jacking issue for delegated dialogs

    XMLWordPrintable

    Details

    • Type: Bug
    • Status: Closed
    • Priority: Minor
    • Resolution: Fixed
    • Component/s: None
    • Labels:
      None
    • Resolution:
      Hide

      dialogs.html specification has been updated with Martin's revised text.

      More specific issues on this non-normative, guidance section can be raised as needed.

      Show
      dialogs.html specification has been updated with Martin's revised text. More specific issues on this non-normative, guidance section can be raised as needed.

      Description

      What

      There is a possibility that client applications that use OSLC delegated dialogs may be vulnerable to click jacking attacks. By inducing victim users to perform actions such as mouse clicks and keystrokes, the attacker can cause them to unwittingly carry out actions within the application that is being targeted. This technique allows the attacker to circumvent defenses against cross-site request forgery, and may result in unauthorized actions.  

      Attack Use Case:

      • An attacker can create an attack page called jts_delete.html
      • Deploy the page to a server
      • Send a link to the Admin
      • When the Admin clicks the link they will be presented with a benign page. Maybe Something Like

                "Authenticated with BSO"
                       Click Continue
                      
      From the screen shot the Attacker has over layed this message on top of the debug console. As a result, the Attacker could align the click with any of the options shown in the screen shot.

      StopAll, RemoveAll, etc... .on other pages there are other 1 click options.

      the point, the screen shot demonstrates that the DEBUG pages (and most pages in CLM) are click jacking vulnerable.

      Remediation
                   
      The TC should review delegated dialogs that are accessible from within the response, and determine whether they can be used by application users to perform any sensitive actions within the application. If so, then a framing attack targeting this response may result in unauthorized actions.

      To effectively prevent framing attacks, the application should return a response header with the name X-Frame-Options and the value DENY to prevent framing altogether, or the value SAMEORIGIN to allow framing only by pages on the same origin as the response itself.  

      The Core TC may want to provide guidance on how to protect from this sort of attack, and implement the prevention mechanism mentioned above.

        Attachments

          Activity

            People

            • Assignee:
              jamsden James Amsden
              Reporter:
              jamsden James Amsden
            • Watchers:
              2 Start watching this issue

              Dates

              • Created:
                Updated:
                Resolved: